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A STUDY IN THE TREATMENT OF CRIME AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES AS
COMPARED TO THE EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES
GEORGE E. GLOS*

It is well known that crimes are being similarly treated all over the
world and that the various systems differ only in details. Yet, it is
equally well known that the crime rate in England and in the other
European countries stands at a much lower level than that in the
United States. The reasons for the high crime rate in the United
States are varied and complex and they have not, to a large extent,
been fully determined. They may be sociological, economic, or racial,
but they may as well stem, at least in a limited way, from the difference
in treatment accorded to the several crimes in the legal system of the
United States as compared with that prevailing in England and the
other European countries and from the difference in prosecution and
treatment of offenders. The purpose of this article is to explore such
differences as they exist today in the treatment of serious crimes in the
leading systems of criminal law and law enforcement.
HOMICIDE

Differences in the treatment of homicide occur in the area of
criminal homicide as distinguished from innocent homicide.' Criminal
homicide is traditionally of two kinds, murder and manslaughter. The
distinction between them consists in the presence or absence of malice
aforethought. 2 Further, the concept of negligent homicide is becoming
0 Professor of Law, St. Mary's University. B.A., Lycee College; LL.B., J.U.D., Charles
University; LL.B., University of Melbourne; LL.M., J.S.D., Yale University Law School.
1 Innocent homicide is understood not to involve criminal guilt and is presented in two
forms as justifiable and excusable homicide. It is not discussed in this article.
2 Malice aforethought has had different meanings at different times. It has been defined as
an unjustifiable, inexcusable and unmitigated man-endangering state of mind, or as a freely
177
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well established.5 This approach recognizes thus a threefold division of
criminal homicide; namely, murder, manslaughter and negligent
homicide. 4 Apart from this basic division, several degrees and shades of
guilt may be statutorily recognized within murder, manslaughter and
negligent homicide with a corresponding differentiation in punishment. Significant differences also occur throughout the law of criminal
homicide, especially with respect to punishment of both completed

crimes and attempts. As to punishment, the penalty for murder in the
several states of the United States usually ranges from imprisonment
for some two years to the death penalty,5 that for manslaughter from a

fine to imprisonment for some twenty-five years,6 and that for negli-

7
gent homicide from a fine to imprisonment for some fifteen years.
The punishment for attempted murder usually ranges from imprisonment for about one year to a term of some twenty-five years.8

In English law, the traditional division of criminal homicide into
murder and manslaughter is retained so that the area of negligent
homicide is fully covered by manslaughter. Murder may be defined as
the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.9
Malice is either express or implied. Constructive malice having been
abolished,' 0 a killing will not amount to murder unless it is done with
the intent to kill or to do grievous bodily harm from which malice
aforethought might be implied." The punishment for murder is
formed intention of a man to pursue a course of conduct which he realizes will or may
bring about the death of some person. It includes both an intention to kill, and an intention to hurt by means of an act which the actor realizes is likely to kill.
3 Negligent homicide is such homicide which would be excusable except that it results
from criminal negligence. It necessarily encroaches on the area covered by manslaughter
and extends to cases in which guilt is based on negligence. It usually deals with traffic
accidents.
4 Even where manslaughter is statutorily abolished as e.g. in Texas, the same concept of
criminal liability is covered in the statute under a different, more specialized heading.
5 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 190 (Deering 1971); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 9-1 (1964);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.30 (McKinney Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1963);
TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1257 (1961).
6E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 193 (Deering 1971); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 9-2 (1964);
N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 125.15, 125.20 (McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4703 (1963).
7 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 193 (Deering 1971); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 9-3 (1964);
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4703 (1963); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. arts. 1230-1243 (1961).
8 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 216-219.3 (Deering 1971); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 8-4
(Supp. 1971); N.Y. PENAL LAw § 110.05 (McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4711
(1963).
9 This is a modernized version of the definition given by Coke and later by Blackstone.
According to them murder occurred "when a person of sound memory and discretion,
unlawfully killeth any reasonable creature in being, and under the King's peace, with
malice aforethought, either express or implied." 3 Co. Inst. 47; 4 Bl. Comm. 198.
10 Homicide Act, 5 & 6 Elis. II c. 11, § 1.
11 Malice aforethought may also be implied when the killing is done with knowledge
that the act in question would probably cause death of grievous bodily harm.
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imprisonment for life. 12 Manslaughter is in effect any homicide which
does not amount to murder. It covers both the concept of voluntary and
involuntary manslaughter as well as negligent homicide. 13 The wide

scope of criminal responsibility in manslaughter is fully reflected in
punishment which may be assessed, namety, imprisonment for life or
14
imprisonment for any shorter term.

The French law makes a fundamental distinction between voluntary
and involuntary homicide. Voluntary homicide is murder, 15 and
murder committed with premeditation or while lying in wait is an
assassination. 6 The punishment for assassination is death, 17 and that
for murder is imprisonment for life.' 8 The killing in the course of
commission of a crime,' 9 or in circumstances which have for their
object to prepare, facilitate or carry out a crime, or to enable an escape,
is also punishable by death.20 A voluntary infliction of wounds without
an intent to kill which, however, causes the victim's death, is punishable with imprisonment from ten to twenty years. 21 If there is premeditation or lying in wait, the penalty is imprisonment for life. 22 Involuntary homicide which is defined as killing by lack of skill, by imprudeice,
inattention, negligence or inobservance of rules, is punishable by
23
imprisonment from three months to two years and with a fine.
24
Attempt is treated as a completed crime.
12 This is in consequence of the Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965, c. 71.
Although the Act abolished the death penalty only for five years and was to expire on
31 July 1970, Parliament in accordance with the provisions of § 4 thereof resolved that the
Act should not so expire. Resolution of the House of Commons of December 16, 1969.
Votes and Proceedings of the House of Commons, 16th December 1969, No. 36, p. 163.
Resolution of the House of Lords of December 18, 1969. House of Lords, Minutes of
Proceedings, 18 December 1969, No. 26, p. 218. The Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty)
Act 1965, c. 71, took thus permanent effect.
The life sentence is mandatory and no lesser sentence can be assessed. The statute
abolishes the death penalty only with respect to murder, so that the death penalty is still
in effect for treason, piracy with violence, and setting fire to Queen's ships, arsenals, etc.
13 The definition of manslaughter is unsatisfactory. Voluntary manslaughter comprises
only those killings which are reduced from murder to manslaughter due to provocation.
Involuntary manslaughter covers all other cases. The English law recognizes, however, that
homicide by pure inadvertence is not manslaughter but will involve the inadvertent person
in civil and not in criminal liability.
14 Offences against the Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. e. 100, § 5; Criminal Justice Act,
1948, 11 & 12 Ceo. 6i c. 58, § 1 (1); Criminal Law Act 1967, c. 58, § 7 (3).
15 All references are to the Code penal, Paris, Journal ofliciel de la Rlpublique fran~aise,
1965, and to the 69e d. Petits Codes Dalloz 1971/72. C. Pn. art. 295.
16 C. Pen. art. 296.
17 C. Pdn. art. 302. Article 302 lists also poisoning causing death as a separate crime
which is also punishable by death.
18 C. Pn. art. 304.
19 I.e., preceding, in the course of, or following the commission of another crime.
20 C. Pn. art. 304.
21 C. Pn. art. 309.
22 C. Pen. art. 310.
23 C. Pdn. art. 319.
24 C. Pn. art. 2.
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The Italian law makes a distinction between homicide, homicide
under aggravating circumstances, non-intentional homicide, homicide
as a consequence of another crime, and negligent homicide. On homicide it basically states that whosoever shall bring about the death of a
person will be punished with imprisonment for not less than twenty-one
years. 25 Homicide under aggravating circumstances is punishable
with imprisonment for life. 20 Aggravating circumstances are: To cover
up the commission of another crime; when committed by an escapee to
avoid arrest or to obtain provisions; in the course of committing rape;
when committed against an ascendant or descendant; by poisoning or
by other base means; with premeditation; with cruelty. 27 On nonintentional homicide it provides that whosoever with the intent to
cause bodily harm brings about the death of a person shall be punished
with imprisonment from ten to eighteen years. 28 The term of imprisonment will be increased by one-third and up to one-half when there are
aggravating circumstances as enumerated above, and up to one-third
when the crime was committed with arms or corrosives. 29 On homicide
as a consequence of another crime it provides that whenever death is
brought about as an unintended consequence of a crime, the punishment is as in negligent homicide, but the term of imprisonment there
prescribed is increased. 30 Negligent homicide is punished by imprisonment from six months to five years. When more than one person is
killed, or one is killed and another or more persons are injured as a
consequence of negligent homicide, the term of imprisonment may be
increased up to twelve years. 3' An attempt to kill is punishable with
imprisonment for not less than twelve years, but if there are aggravating
32
circumstances, with imprisonment from twenty-four to thirty years.
The Spanish law differentiates between parricide, homicide under
aggravating circumstances, simple homicide, and negligent homicide.
Parricide is defined as the killing of the father, mother, child or any
other ascendant or descendant whether legitimate or not, and is punishable with imprisonment for twenty years and one day as a minimum,
and by death as a maximum.33 The same punishment is prescribed for
All references are to the Codice penale, Milano, U. Hoepli, 1970. C. Pen. art. 575.
C. Pen. art. 22. The death penalty which formerly applied to this crime was abolished
by Legislative Decree of August 10, 1944, No. 224. It is still applicable under the provisions
of military law.
27 C. Pen. arts. 576-577.
28 C. Pen. art. 584.
29 C. Pen. art. 585.
So C. Pen. art. 586.
81 C. Pen. art. 589.
32 C. Pen. art. 56.
33 All references are to the C6digo penal. Ed. oficial. 3.ed. Madrid, Ministerio de Justicia,
Boletin Oficial del Estado, 1967. C. Pen. art. 405.
25
20
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homicide under aggravating circumstances. They are: Treacherous
killing; for reward; by flooding, arson, poison or explosives; with
premeditation; with cruelty3 4 Simple homicide is punishable with
imprisonment from twelve years and one day to twenty years.8 5 Negligent homicide may be caused by gross imprudence under such circumstances that had there been malice, it would have amounted to homicide. It is punishable by imprisonment from six months and one day to
six years. When death is caused by simple imprudence or negligence
in breach of regulations (usually safety rules), the punishment is
imprisonment from one month and one day to six months.8 An attempt
to commit parricide or homicide under aggravating circumstances is
punishable with imprisonment from six years and one day to thirty
years. An attempt to commit simple homicide is punishable by imprisonment from six months and one day to twelve years.3 7
The German law distinguishes murder, simple homicide, homicide
under attenuating circumstances, and negligent homicide. Intentional
homicide under specially enumerated circumstances amounts to murder and is punishable with imprisonment for life. The circumstances
are: Killing with a desire to kill; with a sexual motive; with a pecuniary
motive; with any other base motive; treacherously; with cruelty; using
life-endangering means; in order to facilitate or to cover up the commission of another crime. 38 Simple homicide is defined as an intentional
killing under circumstances not amounting to murder. The penalty is
imprisonment for five years as a minimum, but imprisonment for life
may be assessed in cases of particular gravity.8 9 Where there are attenuating circumstances as provocation and the homicide is committed in
hot blood or under other attenuating circumstances, the punishment
is imprisonment from six months to five years.40 Negligent homicide is
punishable with imprisonment from one day to five years. 41 Attempt to
murder is punishable with imprisonment for not less than three years.
In other types of homicide, the term may be reduced up to one-quarter
42
of the lower limit stipulated for the completed crime.
The Austrian law contains provisions for murder, homicide in the
course of robbery, manslaughter, and negligent homicide. It provides
34 C. Pen. art. 406.
85 C. Pen. art. 407.

36 C. Pen. art. 565.
87 C. Pen. arts. 50-52, 73.
88 All references are to the Strafgesetzbuch, Munchen und Berlin, C. H. Beck, 1970,
(W. Ger.). StGB § 211.
39 StGB § 212.
40StGB §§ 213, 16.
41StGB §§ 222, 16.
42 StGB § 44.
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that whosoever with the intent to kill a person acts so as to bring about
the death of that or any other person, is guilty of murder and is punishable with death. 43 Homicide in the course of robbery is also punishable
with death. 44 Homicide brought about with the intent to cause bodily
harm, but without an intent to kill, is manslaughter. The punishment
is imprisonment from five to ten years, but where there is a close family
or other relationship between the offender and the victim, the term
ranges from ten to twenty years. 45 Negligent homicide is punishable by
imprisonment from six months to one year, but the term is extended up
to three years when the act was committed in the operation of railways,
ships, mines, waterworks, and any other machinery; while intoxicated; or when the offender left the scene of the accident without giving
assistance to the victim. 48 Attempted murder is punishable with imprisonment from five to ten years, but in case of an attempt to commit
murder in furtherance of robbery; by poisoning or other treacherous
means; for hire; on relatives by blood or on a spouse; the term is from
ten to twenty years, and in cases of particular gravity it is punishable
47
with imprisonment for life.
The Swiss law provides for murder, simple homicide, manslaughter,
and negligent homicide. 48 Murder is defined as premeditated homicide
whereby the baseness or dangerous character of the offender is manifested. It is punished with imprisonment for life.49 Simple homicide not
amounting to murder is punishable with imprisonment for a minimum
of five years.50 Manslaughter is a homicide committed while the offender's mind was inflamed by passion and is punishable by imprisonment of up to ten years. 51 Negligent homicide is punishable by imprisonment from three days to three years or with a fine.5 2 Attempted
murder is punishable with imprisonment for ten years as a minimum,
and attempt to commit simple homicide with imprisonment from one
to twenty years. 53
Compared with the provisions of the various states of the United
States, the European provisions are somewhat simpler and carry some43 All references are to the Strafgesetz, Wien, Manz, 1968-70. StG §§ 134-156.

44StG § 141.
45StG § 142.
465StG §§ 335-337.
47 StG § 138.
48 All references are to the Strafgesetzbuch, Zuirich, Orell Filssli, 1968. StGB art. 112.
49 There is no death penalty.
50StGB art. 111.
51StGB art. 115.
52StGB arts. 117, 56.
53 StGB arts. 22, 35, 65.
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what stiffer penalties. This trend is quite pronounced especially in'the
area of attempt. It is also to be pointed out that the penalty of imprisonment in homicide in the European countries is not just imprisonment
but penal servitude. 4 Although the death penalty for homicide has
been abolished in a number of European countries carrying with it an
obvious loss of deterrent, it has not been followed by a pronounced
increase in the crime rate. In circumstances prevailing in Europe,
where homicide is, percentagewise, a nearly nonexisting crime, the
abolition of the death penalty can hardly effect a change in the mores,
and the deterrent factor implicit in the death penalty may be abandoned. Such experiment is, however, not advisable for countries with
a notoriously high rate of homicide such as the United States where
the deterrent factor of the death penalty should not lightly be given
away. Wherever the death penalty was abolished in the European
countries, its place was taken by imprisonment for life, and the various
European legal systems take it to mean life. Thus the other factor
implicit in the death penalty, namely, to keep the offender out of circulation whereby society is protected against his dangerous propensities,
is fully kept intact. Consequently, if the deterrent factor in the death
penalty is regarded as not worthy of preservation, incarceration for life
will suffice to protect society. Moreover, imprisonment for life embodies in it a considerable deterrent of its own, so that it is generally
regarded as an adequate substitute for the death penalty. It must be
clearly understood, however, that whenever this approach is adopted,
it is imperative to see to it that the offender is actually kept behind bars
for life, or for at least such a time as to give an assurance that due to his
age and general disposition, there is no likelihood of his committing
further crimes.
Another point worth noting is the treatment of cases where the offender's intent is of importance. The European system conclusively
presumes an intent to kill in cases where the offender makes use of a
weapon which is commonly known to be likely to produce a fatal result,
and also, where the generally vicious character of the offender's conduct is manifested. Therefore, voluntary rather than involuntary homicide will be presumed where the offender used a firearm, an explosive,
a poison, a knife, a heavy object, and virtually any means likely to cause
death.
54 This is so everywhere in the above mentioned countries with the exception of England
where penal servitude was abolished by the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6 c.
58, § 1(1).
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The human element in administering justice is also of importance,
and it can be noted that the European courts show little or no sympathy
to persons found guilty of homicide and assess the penalty accordingly,
very close to the upper limit established by law, rather than to follow a
medium course, or even to assess terms just above the permissible
minimum.
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT

Only one type of aggravated assault is singled out for comparative
evaluation, i.e., an assault involving wounding or violent injury short
of homicide. The penalty prescribed for aggravated assault in the
various states of the United States ranges from a fine to imprisonment
of up to some ten or fifteen years. 55
In English law, the matter is treated under the name of grievous
bodily harm. The punishment is imprisonment for life. 6 The French
law calls it wounding and voluntary assault. The punishment varies in
conformity with the circumstances between five and twenty years of
imprisonment.5 7 In Italian law, it is dealt with under bodily harm with
a range of imprisonment from six to twelve years.5 s In Spanish law, it
is called serious bodily harm and is punishable with imprisonment from
six years and one day to twelve years. 59 The German law treats the
subject under the heading of bodily harm. The offense is punishable by
imprisonment from two to ten years. 60 The Austrian law deals with the
subject under the title of serious bodily harm. The punishment is
imprisonment from five to ten years. 61 In Swiss law, the crime is termed
serious bodily harm and is punishable by imprisonment from six
62
months up to ten years.
ROBBERY

Whatever the scope and wording of the offense in the statutes, robbery is essentially a larceny from the person by violence or intimida55 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 221 (Deering 1971); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 12-2 (Supp.
1971); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 120.10 (McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4709
(1963); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 1148 (1961).

56 Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously by any means whatsoever wound or cause
with intent . . . to do some . . . grievous
bodily harm to any person, or with intent to resist or prevent the lawful apprehension or
detainer of any person. . . . shall be liable to imprisonment for life. Offenses against the
Person Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, § 18; Criminal Justice Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6 c.
58, § 3; Criminal Law Act 1967, c. 58, § 1.
57 C. Pn. arts. 309-313.
58 C. Pen. art. 583.
59 C. Pen. art. 420.
6OStGB § 225.
61StG § 156.
62 StGB art. 122.
any grievous bodily harm to any person . ..
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tion. The punishment applicable in the several states of the United
States is imprisonment for a term which generally ranges from a minimum of some six months to a maximum of some twenty years. 8
64
In English law, robbery is punishable with imprisonment for life.
In French law, it is punishable with imprisonment from ten to twenty
years, but with imprisonment for life if the victim suffers a physical
injury.6 5 If it is committed under certain enumerated circumstances
it is punishable by death.6 6 Italian law punishes robbery with imprisonment from three to ten years and with a fine, but the term is increased
from one-third to one-half if the crime is committed with weapons, in
disguise, or by two or more persons acting together. 67 Spanish law
provides for imprisonment from six months and one day to thirty
years in accordance with the gravity of the crime. 68 German law punishes robbery with imprisonment from one to fifteen years. 69 Under
aggravated circumstances the minimum term is increased to five years,7 0
and the offense is punishable with imprisonment from ten years to life
if the victim suffers bodily harm. 71 Austrian law punishes robbery with
imprisonment from ten to twenty years but when the victim suffers
serious bodily harm, the punishment is imprisonment for life. 72 In
Swiss law, robbery is punishable by imprisonment from six months to
73
life in accordance with the gravity of the crime.
63 E.g., N.Y.

PENAL LAW §§

4705 (1963); TEx.

70.00, 160.15 (McKinney 1967);

PENAL CODE ANN.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

18,

§§

4704,

art. 1408 (1953).

64 Theft Act 1968, c. 60, § 8. (1) A person is guilty of robbery if he steals, and immediately
before or at the time of doing so, and in order to do so, he uses force on any person or
puts or seeks to put any person in fear of being then and there subjected to force. (2) A
person guilty of robbery, or of an assault with intent to rob, shall on conviction on indictment be liable to imprisonment. for life.
65 C. P6n. art. 382.
66 C. P6n. art. 381 provides for the death penalty if the offender is armed irrespective
whether the weapon is concealed or not, or actually displayed or not. The same applies if
the weapon is in a motor vehicle used by the offender to take him to the place of the
crime or to take him away from it.
67 C. Pen. art. 628.
68 C. Pen. arts. 500-502. In accordance with provisions of article 501, whenever death is
caused in the course of robbery, the punishment ranges from imprisonment for twenty
years and one day to death. Whenever bodily harm is caused, the term of imprisonment
ranges in accordance with the gravity of the injury from six months and one day up"to
thirty years. The terms range, however, from four years, two months and one day up to
thirty years whenever the offender uses a weapon.
69 StGB § 249.
70 StGB § 250. This is so in the case of an armed robbery; when the robbery is carried
out by more than one person; when it is carried out in a public place; or at night in an
inhabited building; or when the offender has previously been convicted of robbery.
71 StGB § 251.
72 StG §§ 190-195.
73 StGB art. 139. Simple robbery is punishable with imprisonment from six months to
twenty years. If the victim is threatened with death; is injured; the crime is committed by
a gang; or where the dangerous character of the offender is manifested; the terra of 'imprisonment ranges from five years to twenty years. If the victim dies in consequence of the
act and the offender could have foreseen it, or if the crime is carried out treacherously,
the punishment is imprisonment for life.
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BURGLARY

Burglary has been defined as the breaking and entering of the dwelling of another at night with intent to commit a felony. If committed
during the day, it is usually termed housebreaking. Today, it is a
statutory offense and the term burglary generally applies regardless of
the time of commission. In the several states of the United States,
burglary is punishable with imprisonment that ranges generally from
74
one up to some twenty or twenty-five years.
English law punishes burglary with imprisonment not exceeding
fourteen years, 76 and an aggravated burglary with imprisonment for
life. 76 French law provides for imprisonment ranging from five years to
life. 77 In Italian law, burglary is punishable by imprisonment from one

to six years and with a fine, and an aggravated burglary with imprison74 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 461 (Deering 1971); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 19-1 (1970)
(in California and Illinois the penalty may range from one year to life imprisonment);
N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70.00, 140.00-140.35 (McKinney 1967), as amended, N.Y. PENAL LAW
§§ 140.00(2), 140.10, 140.17, 140.25(d), 140.30 (McKinney Supp. 1970); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 4901 (1963); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. arts. 1389-1402 (1953).
75 Theft Act 1968, c. 60, § 9. (1) A person is guilty of burglary if(a) he enters any building or part of a building as a trespasser and with intent to commit
any such offence as is mentioned in section (2) below; or
(b) having entered any building or part of a building as a trespasser he steals or attempts
to steal anything in the building or that part of it or inflicts or attempts to inflict
on any person therein any grievous bodily harm.
(2) The offences referred to in subsection (1)(a) above are offences of stealing anything
in the building or part of a building in question, of inflicting on any person therein
any grievous bodily harm or raping any woman therein, and of doing unlawful
damage to the building or anything therein.
(3) References in subsections (1) and (2) above to a building shall apply also to an
inhabited vehicle or vessel, and shall apply to any such vehicle or vessel at times
when the person having a habitation in it is not there as well as at times when he is.
(4) A person guilty of burglary shall on conviction on indictment be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding fourteen years.
76 Theft Act 1968, c. 60, § 10. (1) A person is guilty of aggravated burglary if he commits
any burglary and at the time has with him any firearm or imitation firearm, any weapon
of offence, or any explosive; and for this purpose(a) "firearm" includes an airgun or air pistol, and "imitation firearm" means anything
which has the appearance of being a firearm, whether capable of being discharged
or not; and
(b) "weapon of offence" means any article made or adapted for use for causing injury to
or incapacitating a person, or intended by the person having it with him for such
use; and
(c) "explosive" means any article manufactured for the purpose of producing a practical
effect by explosion, or intended by the person having it with him for that purpose.
(2) A person guilty of aggravated burglary shall on conviction on indictment be liable
to imprisonment for life.
77 C. Pdn. art. 381 provides for imprisonment for life for any offender who commits
larceny under the concurrence of four of the following five elements: 1. When committed at
night. 2. By two or more persons. 3. By breaking in a building used for habitation. 4. When
committed by force. 5. With use of a motor vehicle. C. Pdn. art. 384 provides for imprisonment from ten to twenty years for any offender who commits larceny by breaking in a
building not used for habitation. C. Pdn. art. 386 provides for imprisonment from five to
ten years for any offender who commits larceny in a building used for habitation either at
night or when the act is committed by two or more persons.
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ment from three to ten years and with a fine.78 Spanish law punishes
burglary with imprisonment from one month and one day up to twelve
years in accordance with the value of the property stolen.7 9 When,
however, the offender is armed, or the crime takes place in an inhabited
building, or a public building, or a building dedicated to religious
purposes, the term of imprisonment ranges from four months and one
day to twelve years. When the offense is committed in the above enumerated buildings and the offender is armed, the term of imprisonment
ranges from four months and one day up to twenty years.80 German law
prescribes as punishment for burglary a term of imprisonment from one
to ten years; 8 ' in aggravated cases from five to ten years.82 Austrian law
punishes burglary with imprisonment from six months to ten years.8 3
In Swiss law, the punishment for burglary lies between three months
84
and ten years.
RIOT

Riot is defined as a disturbance of the peace by three or more persons
acting together in the commission of a crime by open force, or in the
execution of some enterprise, lawful or unlawful, in such a violent,
turbulent and unauthorized manner as to create likelihood of public
terror and alarm. In the various states of the United States, the punishment for rioting generally ranges from a fine to imprisonment for some
ten years.8 5
In English law, riot is a common law misdemeanor punishable by
fine and imprisonment. If an injury to buildings, machinery, etc., is
caused by rioters, it is punishable by imprisonment not exceeding
seven years,8 6 and when such buildings, machinery, etc., are demolished,
78 C. Pen. art. 625, punishes larceny with imprisonment from one to six years and with
a fine, when committed by breaking in a building used for habitation. Where the offender
used force or fraudulent means; or where he carried a weapon without using it; or where
he acted by trick; or where he acted in conjunction with two or more persons; or where he
pretended to be a public officer; or where the act was committed in a station or terminal
on travelers' luggage; the punishment is increased to imprisonment from three to ten years
and a fine.
79 C. Pen. arts. 504-505.
80 C. Pen. art. 506.
81 StGB § 243.
82 StGB § 250(4).
83 StG §§ 174 1(4), 178-180.
84 StGB art. 137.
85 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 405 (Deering 1971); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 25-1 (1970);
N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 240.05-240.08 (McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4401 (1963);
Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. arts. 455-472 (1952), as amended, Tax. PENAL CODE ANN. arts. 466a,
472a (Supp. 1971).
86 Malicious Damage Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, § 12.
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each and every offender is liable to imprisonment for life. 87 In French
law, a riot from which no damage to property is caused is punishable
with imprisonment from three months to five years in accordance with
its gravity. 88 When damage or loss of property occurs, the punishment
ranges from imprisonment for ten years to death. 89 In Italian law, riot
is punishable in accordance with the gravity of the offense with imprisonment from three years to life.90 In Spanish law, penalties for rioting range from imprisonment for six months and one day to the death
penalty.9 ' German law punishes rioting with imprisonment from three
months to ten years.9 2 In Austrian law, riot is punished with imprisonment from one year up to the death penalty. 93 The penalty for rioting
94
in Swiss law is imprisonment from three days to three years.
Aggravated assault, robbery, burglary, and riot are, apart from homicide, perhaps the most serious crimes of violence known to the law.
They are therefore similarly treated. The object of the protracted terms
of imprisonment prescribed as punishment is not only to utilize the
retribution and deterrent elements of the punishment but foremost to
protect society from further crimes likely to be committed by the
offender by keeping him in detention. And as in homicide, it can be
noted that the terms prescribed by the various European penal codes
are generally of longer duration than their counterparts in the United
States. In addition, following their practice established in homicide,
the European courts actually assess meaningful terms keeping closely
to the upper limit prescribed by the codes. Experience has shown that
persons who have already committed a violent crime are very likely to
commit further crimes of that nature. This may well be attributable to
their violent disposition. Naturally, attempts should be made to re-educate these offenders and also to provide medical treatment whenever
medical science can offer a cure. Nonetheless, until definite results of
re-education and medical treatment are shown, the offender should be
isolated from contact with the general public. Experience has also established that it is especially a young and physically fit person who
engages in the commission of these crimes. Quite naturally, a person of
8T Malicious Damage Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict. c. 97, § 11. The Riot Act (1714) 1 Geo. I. st.
2, c. 5, has been repealed.
88 C. Pn. arts. 104-108.
89 C. Pn. arts. 98-99.
90 C. Pen. arts. 284-285.
91 C. Pen. arts. 218-224.
92StGB §§ 115, 125.
93 StG §§ 68-75, 83-86.
94 StGB art. 260.
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more advanced age, of more mature mind, and consequently also of less
fit physical attributes is less likely to commit a crime which in itself
presupposes both mental and physical strain and an element which in
lawful activity is rightfully called courage. If therefore a sufficiently
extended term of imprisonment is assessed to keep the offender in detention for so long until he reaches a more mature age when he is both
mentally and physically less fitted to engage in criminal adventures,
there is a good chance that he will actually abstain from further unlawful activity. The observation can therefore be made that there is a
definite likelihood that the European technique of assessing longer
terms of imprisonment is conducive to keeping down the crime rate
both as to first offenders and repeaters. 95
INSANITY

For several centuries insanity has been regarded as absolving the
offender of criminal responsibility.9 6 Both the Anglo-American criminal
law and that of the European countries are in full agreement with the
proposition that when a person has committed a crime while suffering
from insanity, he should not be punished for having committed the
95 As far as riot is concerned, if riots occur not as isolated events, but on a continuing
basis, they are usually caused by organized groups of evildoers who conspire to incite them.
The organizers generally rely on paid professional agitators whose task it is to surround
themselves with gullible misguided enthusiasts whom they can incite to riot under the
pretext of some seemingly legitimate grievances. Youth, due to its lack of experience, has
traditionally been a favorite target for misuse by such unscrupulous elements. To bring
the rioting to an end, the professional agitators must be placed in custody and vigorously
prosecuted.
Whenever riots of continuing nature arose in Europe in recent years, they were designed
along the above described pattern. Repeated police charges and attempts to disperse the
crowds were exactly what the riot organizers desired, for it produced a new tie of attachment of the misguided persons being used to the professional agitators who directed the
riot, and it enabled the professional agitators to make new recruits among the gullible, now
made indignant because of alleged police brutality.
Whenever the proper technique to suppress such rioting was adopted, as e.g. in Italy in
the late nineteen forties, the rioters were surrounded by concentrated police units, routes
of escape were blocked by trucks and armored cars, and the rioters were arrested one by one,
handcuffed, loaded in trucks and brought to barracks for questioning. There they were
processed and properly prosecuted. Soon the gullible were separated from the professional
agitators who in their great majority were out of town people. It appeared that they were
in the tens, hundreds, and in large riots even in the thousands. They were paid not only
for rioting, but had travel and living expenses paid. They traveled all over the country,
sometimes in chartered vehicles, to stage riots and in the tumult were not readily recognized
as out of town people. Once in custody, the rioting cycle was interrupted, the rioting
decreased immediately as one group was already under arrest. As further groups were taken
out of circulation, the whole rioting plan was summarily called off by the organizers because of shortage of agitators, and also because they realized that their remaining agitators
faced certain arrest and prosecution.
963 HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 371 ff. (5th ed. 1942). What is meant and
discussed here is insanity which relieves the offender of criminal responsibility, as contrasted with the so-called diminished responsibility which has the effect of e.g. reducing
murder to manslaughter, and which is not discussed in this article.
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act. The punishment would not do any good since the person was not
aware that he was doing wrong, nor would the threat of punishment
have any prospect of deterring such person from committing the act.
A distinction is always made between insanity existing at the time of
commission of the crime and unfitness to plead due to supervening
insanity. With respect to unfitness to plead, American law as well as the
English and Continental law uniformly hold that if the offender was
sane at the time of the commission of the offense but insane at the time
of the criminal proceedings instituted against him, he should be committed to a proper institution for treatment and should stand trial
upon regaining his mental faculties9 7
A more serious problem arises in case of insanity existing at the time
of commission of the crime. If a person accused of having committed a
crime is found insane at the time of the criminal proceedings pending
against him, it may also be assumed and should not prove impossible
to establish that he was also insane at the time of commission of the
crime. The converse would also seem logical, namely, if a person is
found sane at trial, it does not seem likely that he was suffering from
insanity at the time of commission of the crime. This is especially true
when only a reasonably short time has elapsed between the commission
of the act and the pronouncement on mental competency and where
the accused did not have the benefit of medical treatment in the meantime. Consequently, the finding of insanity at the commission of the
act together with a finding of no mental incapacity at trial is rare. The
main distinction between the statutory provisions of the several states
in the United States and those of England and the countries of Continental Europe in this respect lies in the fact that while such finding
may be made under the statutes of the several states in the United
States, it may either not be made under those of Europe or, even if it
theoretically could be made, it is never so made and the offender is
always committed to a proper institution."
97 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1026, 1026a (Deering 1971); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 6-2
(1964), §§ 104-2, 104-3 (1970); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 30.05 (McKinney 1967); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 19, § 1352 (1964); TEX. CODE CrIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 4602 (Supp. 1971). English Criminal
Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, c. 84, § 4, 5. French C. Pro. Pn. art. 81. All references are
to the Code de procdure p~nale, Paris, Journal officiel de la R4publique franqaise, 1965,
and to the 13e 6d. Petits Codes Dalloz 1971/72. Italian C. Pro. Pen. art. 88. All references
are to the Codice di procedura penale, Milano, Pirola, 1970. Spanish L.E. Criminal, art. 383.
All references are to the Ley de enjuiciamiento criminal. Ed. oficial. 3.ed. Madrid, Ministerio
de Justicia, Boletin Oficial del Estado, 1967. German StPO § 81. All references are to
the Strafprozessordnung, Minchen und Berlin, C.H. Beck, 1970, (W.Ger.). Austrian
Krankenanstaltengesetz vom 18.12.1956, BGB1. Nr. 1/1957, § 50, and also StPO § 134. All
references are to the Strafprozessordnung, Wien, Manz, 1968-70. Swiss, e.g. Kanton Zflrich,
StPO § 391. All references are to the Kanton Ziurich, Strafprozessordnung, Ziurich 1964.
98 Id.
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It is well known that extremely liberal provisions and practice concerning insanity lend themselves to abuses. It is not uncommon for an
offender to plead insanity to a charge of having committed a serious
crime, often homicide, and on the strength of a cooperative expert
medical opinion, an equally cooperative jury finds him not guilty on
the ground of insanity. He is thereupon committed to a proper institution; but a relatively short time thereafter (just one year or so), he is
declared sane on the strength of another powerful medical opinion, and
is released by another cooperative jury. In these circumstances it is
quite evident that if the offender is actually sane at the time of his
release, he most likely was also perfectly sane at the time of the commission of the offence and vice versa, i.e., if he actually was insane at
the time of the commission of the offense, he would still in all likelihood be so insane at the time of his release.
In order to avoid these doubts and not to lend itself to abuses, the
European theory and practice follows a somewhat different course.
Where the defense of insanity has been accepted, the court orders the
prisoner to be kept in custody during the pleasure of proper administrative authority at such, place and manner as the authority may think
fit. The confinement is understood to be prolonged and may well be
lifelong. Consequently, the defense of insanity is rarely set up except
in heinous crimes.
In English law, where the defense proves successful, the jury will
return a special verdict that the accused is not guilty by reason of
insanity99 whereupon the court has the duty to make an order that the
accused be admitted to such hospital as may be specified by the Secretary of State. 1°0 The accused is then detained in the hospital or hospitals
in the discretion of the Secretary of State and may be discharged only
at his direction.10 ' The detention is of an extensive nature, possibly
for life, and it is therefore not surprising that insanity is plead only in
the most serious cases.
French law on the subject is closely similar to English law. 10 2 In
Italian law, the penal code determines the minimum period of time
the accused has to spend in a mental hospital for prisoners. Neither
the court nor any other authority has power to shorten such period
of confinement. 08 The term is ten years if the crime is punishable
99 Criminal Procedure (Insanity) Act 1964, c. 84, § 1.

100 Id. § 5.

101 Mental Health Act 1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2 c. 72, § 71(2).

102 C.
103 C.

Pen. art. 64, C. Pro. PNn. arts. 81, D. 23-26.
Pen. arts. 85, 88, 215 (2).
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with imprisonment for life, five years if the crime is punishable with
imprisonment for a minimum of ten years, and two years in all other
cases. 04 Beyond that, the prisoner may be released only when he is
declared sane and neither dangerous to himself nor to society, in special proceedings instituted for that purpose. A release may not easily
be obtained under these circumstances and the confinement may extend for a long period of time, even for life. In Spanish law, when the
defense of insanity is accepted by the court in prosecution for a crime,
the court has to order the confinement of the accused to a proper institution for an undetermined time from which he cannot be released
without a further order of the same court upon his recovery. 10 5 German
law contains identical provisions but the release of the detained person
may be ordered by any court having jurisdiction. 10 6 Austrian law contains similar provisions. 107 In Swiss law, the confinement of the accused
in a proper institution designated by the cantonal department of justice
is ordered by the court for an undetermined length of time. He is then
held there in the discretion of the cantonal department of justice and
can be released only at its direction. If so released, he may be recommitted by a simple order of the same authority. 0
The element of concern for the victim of crime and for society at
large is apparent from the foregoing approach. It matters little to the
victim that he was injured or killed by an insane person. Since the
insane cannot be punished for obvious reasons, the law owes it to the
victim and to the public at large to make it absolutely certain that the
insane offender is securely detained until he is declared fully in command of his faculties and will neither endanger himself nor society.
BAIL

Both federal and state laws uniformly provide that any person charged
with other than a capital offense shall be entitled to bail. 09 Some state
laws go even further and require "evident proof" 110 or "great presumption""' of guilt to make a capital offense not bailable. Prisoners are
entitled to bail as a matter of right, and bail is usually continued even
C. Pen. art. 222.
105 C. Pen. art. 8.
100 StGB § 51, 42b, f. StPO § 429a-d.
107 StG § 2. StPO § 134.
108 StGB arts. 10, 14, 17. Kanton Zurich, StPO §§ 391, 393-394.
109E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3141 (Supp. V 1970); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 110-4 (1970); N.Y.
CODE CRIM. PROC. §§ 550, 552-554 (McKinney Supp. 1971).
110 TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.07 (1966).
111 CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 1268-1276 (Deering 1961), §§ 1269b, 1269c (Deering Supp.
104

1971).
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pending appeal. The present position constitutes a considerable relaxation of the rules in existence at the time of Blackstone when persons
accused of murder, manslaughter (if clearly the slayer), and persons
taken in the act of felony were not bailable, 112 and there was no bail
pending appeal.
The entire idea of bail is predicated upon the principle that an accused is presumed innocent until convicted by a proper tribunal. As
his guilt has not been established, there is no reason for his detention
which would in fact be tantamount to punishment. If he is detained,
it is only to secure his attendance at trial. Consequently, where the
accused can be trusted to actually appear when required, he should not
be detained. The purpose of bail is thus to secure attendance of the
accused in the criminal proceedings instituted against him, and especially, his appearance at trial.
Bail should therefore not be excessive but commensurate with and
in proportion to the penalty which could be assessed in case the accused is found guilty of the offense charged. 18 When, however, the
penalty which could be assessed in a particular case is of a serious
nature, such as imprisonment for a considerable time, for life, or the
death penalty, then bail is not likely to serve its purpose, for then in the
words of Blackstone, the accused has no other surety but the four walls
4
of the prison.1
The justification for granting bail is also not present when the
person was apprehended in the act or when although he was not so
apprehended, the proof against him is evident. As it is unlikely that
he would be acquitted at trial under these circumstances, the presumption of innocence cannot apply in all its force and the likelihood
of his not appearing at trial if released on bail is greatly increased.
In such cases, considerations for the rights of the victim of crime
are also of special cogency. The right of a person not to be the victim of crime must be considered together with the right of the accused to a fair trial and to the presumption of his innocence. Due
regard for fair treatment of the victim of crime demands that the ac112 Blackstone, Book IV. 298-9. This held true from the oldest times. Glanvil says:
"In omnibus placitis de felonia solet accusatus per plegios dimitti, praeterquam in placito
de homicidio, ubi ad terrorem aliter statutum est." (In all pleas of felony the accused is
usually discharged upon bail, except in the plea of murder, where, to deter others, it is
otherwise decreed.) Glanvil 1.14.c.l.; Blackstone, Book IV. 298.
a13
Bill of Rights, 1688, 1 Will. & Mary, st. 2, c. 2.
114 Blackstone, Book IV. 298. Says Blackstone: ". . . in felonies and other offences of a

capital nature, no bail can be a security equivalent to the actual custody of the person.
For what is there that a man may not be induced to forfeit to save his own life?" Book
IV. 296-7.
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cused be not granted bail in these circumstances. This is especially
true when the victim suffers physical injury. It just does not make
sense to let the reputed offender go free on bail while the victim lies
in the hospital. To admit persons to bail under these circumstances
makes a clear mockery of justice and subverts as well the element of
deterrent implicit in punishment. The case for refusal of bail is even
stronger if the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the crime
committed against him.
Bail should also not be granted to persons previously convicted of
serious offenses because of the possibility of their committing further
offenses while free. Similarly, persons previously found guilty of jumping bail should not be admitted to bail because they cannot be trusted
to abide by the conditions thereof.
All the above principles are fully embodied in the criminal law in
the countries of Continental Europe. These systems go even further
and regard release on bail as an exceptional measure. As a general
rule, bail is not granted and the accused is kept in custody until trial
when further orders as to his release or custody are made. Bail is
rarely granted in the case of a felony. It is purely discretionary and
is in fact available only in prosecutions for minor offenses and in circumstances when it appears quite unlikely that the accused would not
appear when required. As to the actual bail given, the money or value
given must actually belong to the accused so that he would suffer a
considerable financial loss if it were forfeited. No bonding companies
exist. If the accused is penniless or if he has no steady place of abode,
bail cannot be granted even in the case of a minor offense.
In England, bail is always discretionary. If it is refused or granted
on terms unacceptable to the petitioner, he may petition the High
Court which has the power to admit him to bail or vary the conditions
on which bail was granted."15 Although he may be admitted to bail
even if he is accused of murder, bail is not readily granted where the
petitioner is accused of a serious crime. Bail may, however, be continued pending the determination of an appeal from a conviction." 6
In French law, the accused is entitled to bail only if he is accused
of having committed a misdemeanor or an offense for which the
maximum penalty is imprisonment for less than two years, and if he
has not previously been convicted of a felony or sentenced to imprisonment for more than three months and the sentence has not been pro"15Criminal

Justice Act 1967, c. 80, § 22.
116 Criminal Appeal Act 1968, c. 19, § 19.

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol3/iss2/1

18

Glos: A Study in the Treatment of Crime and Law Enforcement in the Unit

19711

TREATMENT OF CRIME

bated. He must still satisfy the judge that he will appear when required. 117 Beyond this rule, and always in the case of felony, bail is
purely discretionary and is not readily obtainable." 8
In Italian law, bail is not obtainable whenever the accused is charged
with a crime the minimum penalty for which is imprisonment for five
years, or when he is charged with dealing with or possession of narcotics,
or counterfeiting of currency irrespective of penalty. n 9 Apart from
this rule, bail is purely discretionary and is granted only when the
accused gives sufficient proof that he will appear when required. A
person is entitled to bail when he is accused of an offense punishable
with imprisonment for less than three years as a maximum, or for
less than two years as a maximum if he has previously been convicted
of an offense of a similar nature, or when he is accused of an offense
committed negligently if it is punishable with imprisonment for less
than five years. He must, however, give proof that he will appear when
required, and if he is unsuccessful in doing so, he cannot be admitted
120
to bail.
In Spanish law, bail is not obtainable whenever the accused is
charged with a felony carrying a minimum term of imprisonment of
twelve years.' 2 ' Beyond this rule, bail is discretionary but is likely to
be granted only in cases involving minor offenses which carry a maximum term of imprisonment of six months and when there is no
22
likelihood that the accused would absent himself.
In German law, bail is purely discretionary. It may not be granted
when the accused is charged with a felony and when evidence against
him is overwhelming. It is also not granted, irrespective of the nature
of the offense, when the accused is under suspicion that he would
remove himself from the court's jurisdiction in order to escape prosecution, and also when there is danger that he would be tampering
with the evidence or that he would influence witnesses. 2 3 Bail is
usually granted only to persons accused of minor offenses which do
not carry a penalty of imprisonment for more than six weeks and who
are beyond suspicion of escaping to avoid prosecution. 124
In Austrian law, a person accused of a felony punishable with im117 C. Pro. Pn. art. 138.
118 C. Pro. Nn. arts. 139-149.
119 C. Pro. Pen. art. 253.
120 C. Pro. Pen. arts. 254-256.
121 C. Pen. art. 503.
122 C. Pen. art. 529.
123 StPO §§ 112-113.
124 StPO §§ 113, 117.
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prisonment for a minimum of ten years is not eligible for bail. He
may be admitted to bail if the felony of which he is accused is punishable with imprisonment for a shorter term. He is entitled to bail
when the felony with which he is charged is punishable with imprisonment for less than five years as a maximum. To be admitted to bail,
however, the accused must in all cases establish that he will appear
when required and he must give an adequate security for his appear125
ance.
In Swiss law, bail is always discretionary. It may not be granted
when the accused is charged with a felony or misdemeanor and there
is danger that he would be tampering with the evidence or that he
would leave the court's jurisdiction in order to escape prosecution.
If charged only with an offense, he should be admitted to bail unless
126
he is likely to escape.
PROBATION AND PAROLE

Probation is a device which makes it possible for the court to suspend
the sentence in proper cases and let a convicted offender go free on
condition that he shall conduct himself well for a stipulated time.
Parole makes it possible for a proper administrative authority to
release a convicted offender from serving the remainder of the sentence
assessed against him after he had already served part of the term. Both
probation and parole are predicated upon the idea of rehabilitation;
namely, to offer the offender a helping hand in the hope that he will
be thus induced to keep himself out of trouble. It follows that only
persons who give reasonable promise of rehabilitation may be admitted
to probation or released on parole, and also that certain crimes are
excepted from probation.
PROBATION

In general, the law of the United States and that of the various states
of the Union admits to probation offenders convicted of crimes not
punishable with death or life imprisonment. 127 Some states do not
admit to probation persons convicted of serious crimes like murder
or attempted murder or robbery with a deadly weapon, 128 some other
states admit to probation only such persons who are assessed a term of
125StPO §§ 190-197.
126 Kanton Zflrich, StPO §§ 49-50, 339.
127 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1964).
128 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 1203 (Deering Supp. 1971); PA.
(1964).
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imprisonment not longer than e.g., ten years, irrespective of the nature
of the offense.1 29 The provisions of some states are stricter than others,
but in general, rules concerning probation are very liberal as compared
with those existing in England and in the various countries of Continental Europe.
In the European system, persons convicted of more serious crimes
are not eligible for probation. Probation is generally limited to offenders convicted of minor offenses only who have been assessed a term of
imprisonment usually not longer than one year (five years as a maximum), and who have not previously been convicted. Also, offenders
considered for probation must appear not to be likely to commit further offenses.
English law provides that where a person is convicted of an offense
not carrying the sentence of death or life imprisonment and having
regard to the circumstances, including the nature of the offense and
the character of the offender, provided it is expedient to do so, the court
may, instead of sentencing him, admit him to probation.1 30 Although
probation is thus available even to persons convicted of serious crimes,
it is limited in practice to minor offenses only and to persons not previously convicted, for it would not be appropriate to admit a person to
probation in more serious cases having regard to the nature of the
offense and to the character of the offender.
French law provides that a person convicted of a misdemeanor or
of an offense for which he could not be assessed a term of imprisonment exceeding five years, and who has not previously been convicted
of a felony nor of a misdemeanor, may be admitted to probation. 131
In Italian law, only persons who have been assessed a term of imprisonment not exceeding one year and who have not previously been convicted of felony nor of a misdemeanor are eligible for probation. 132 In
Spanish law, probation is available only in the case of a conviction to
a term not longer than one year, and to a person not previously convicted of any offense. 1 3
In German law, a person may be admitted to probation if he is
assessed a term of imprisonment not exceeding nine months and if
within the last five years before the conviction of the offense he has
129 E.g., TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 (1966), as amended, Tx. CODE CRaM.
PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 (Supp. 1971). (Only certain sections were amended and codified in the
1971 Supplement).
130 Criminal Justice Act 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6 c. 58, § 3.
131 C. Pro. Pen. arts. 734-747, C. Pdn. art. 40.
132 C. Pen. arts. 163-168.
133 C. Pen. arts. 92-93.
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not been, upon conviction for any offense, assessed a term of imprisonment exceeding six months or admitted to probation. 13 4 In Austrian
law, a person may be admitted to probation if the offense of which
he was found guilty is punishable with imprisonment for less than
five years, and where having regard to the nature of the offense and
the character and age of the offender and to the fact that he has,
whenever possible, made good the loss or damage caused, it appears to
be preferable to admit him to probation rather than have him suffer
the penalty of imprisonment. 36 In Swiss law, probation is available
only to persons who have been assessed a term of imprisonment not
exceeding one year, and who have not been convicted of a felony nor
of a misdemeanor within the five years immediately preceding the
commission of the offense. Such persons must also make good all the
loss or damage caused, and must appear to be unlikely to commit
further offenses. 136
PAROLE
As a general rule, the law of the United States and that of the several
states of the Union provides that a convicted offender may be paroled
after having served one-fourth to one-third of his sentence of imprisonment, and in any case (i.e. life imprisonment), after having served
seven to twenty years. 13 7 Similar to the rules governing probation, these
provisions are very liberal indeed, as compared with those of the
European countries.
The European provisions make a convicted offender eligible for
parole after he has served one-half to three-fourths of the term of imprisonment. A person imprisoned for life may be paroled after he has
served some fifteen to twenty-eight years. In each case, the prisoner
must have merited parole by his good conduct in prison and must
give promise of an honorable conduct after his discharge.
In English law, a prisoner serving a sentence of imprisonment for
a term of more than one month may be granted remission of part of
the sentence on the ground of his industry and good conduct. Such
remission may not exceed one-third of the sentence. 138 Persons con134 StGB § 23.
135 Gesetz iiber die bedingte Verurteilung 1949, BGBI. Nr. 277, I. § 1.
136 StGB art. 41.
137 E.g., 18 U.S.C. § 4202 (1964); CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 3040-3065 (Deering 1961);
ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 38, § 123-2 (1964); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.40 (McKinney 1967); TEX. CODE
CriM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12 (1966), as amended, TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 42.12
(Supp. 1971). (Only certain sections were amended and codified in the 1971 Supplement.)
138 Prison Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & I Eliz. 2 c. 52. & 25, The Prison (Amendment)
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victed to imprisonment for life may also be paroled but no rule exists
as to their eligibility for parole except that they may be paroled in
the discretion of the Secretary of State. This discretion is rarely exercised and only after the offender has served a very extensive term of
imprisonment. 39
In French law, parole may be granted after the prisoner has served
one-half of his term but not less than three months. A prisoner who
has previously been convicted of a felony or of a misdemeanor may
become eligible after he has served two-thirds of his term but not less
than six months. In the case of imprisonment for life, the prisoner may
be paroled after he has served fifteen years of imprisonment.140 In
Italian law, a prisoner may be paroled after he has served one-half of
his term. He must have served, however, at least thirty months, and
no more than five years of his sentence may be remitted. In case of a
prisoner previously convicted, he must serve at least three-fourths of
the term but not less than four years. Prisoners convicted to life imprisonment are eligible for parole after having served twenty-eight
years.141 In Spanish law, the prisoner must serve three-fourths of his
term before he is eligible for parole. Only those imprisoned for a term
42
of one year or longer are eligible.1
In German law, parole may be obtained after the prisoner has served
two-thirds of his term and three months as a minimum. A person sentenced to life is not eligible for parole; however, the prisoner may
petition for remission and obtain pardon.143 In Austrian law, a prisoner
is eligible for parole after he has served two-thirds of his term and a
minimum of eight months. A prisoner serving a life sentence may be
paroled after twenty years.144 In Swiss law, a prisoner may be paroled
after he has served two-thirds of his term and three months as a minimum. In the case of imprisonment for life, the prisoner may be paroled
4
after fifteen years.1 5
Rules 1968, Stat. instr. 1968 No. 440, (Rule substituted for Rule 5 of the Principal Rules,
The Prison Rules 1964, Stat. Instr. 1964 No. 388, r. 5.).
139 Criminal Justice Act 1967, c. 80, § 61. Section 61(1) provides: "The Secretary of State
may, if recommended to do so by the Parole Board, release on licence a person serving a
sentence of imprisonment for life ....but shall not do so in the case of a person sentenced
to imprisonment for life or to detention during Her Majesty's pleasure or for life except
after consultation with the Lord Chief Justice of England together with the trial judge if
available." See also The Murder (Abolition of Death Penalty) Act 1965, c. 71, § 2.
140 C. Pro. Pen. art. 729.
141 C. Pen. art. 176.
142 C. Pen. art. 98. There is no life sentence in Spanish law, the maximum term of
imprisonment being forty years. In such case, the prisoner is eligible for parole after having
served thirty years.
143 StGB § 26.
144 Gesetz fiber die bedingte Verurteilung 1949, BGB1, Nr. 277, I. § 12.
145

StGB art. 38.
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It is thus quite apparent that in the European countries the prisoner
has to serve a much longer part of his term before he is eligible for
parole. This is, however, subject to a further qualification that while
in the United States a prisoner is usually paroled as soon as he becomes
eligible for parole, such a rule does not obtain in the European countries. Since a prisoner must give promise of good conduct after his
discharge, only very few prisoners are actually paroled as soon as they
become eligible, some are paroled at a later date, and many are never
paroled. Parole is purely discretionary and it is used with caution. It
is interesting to note, in this connection, that many American juries
are not in agreement with the liberal policy of granting parole and
indicate their displeasure at a premature release of prisoners by assessing prolonged terms of imprisonment of sixty, one hundred, and even
more years in the hope that the parole boards will take their advice in
consideration and will not parole prisoners who do not deserve it.
HABITUAL CRIMINALS

The laws of the several states in the United States provide on the
average that upon third conviction for misdemeanor or felony, the
offender shall be sentenced to the maximum provided as penalty for
the offense for which he is then convicted. 146 Some states are stricter
and increase the penalty upon a second conviction, 147 or in the case
of felonies, provide for imprisonment for life upon a third conviction.148 Although these provisions appear reasonably strict, they are
still quite lenient if considered in conjunction with the provisions for
bail, probation and parole and the practice of granting the same. True,
habitual offenders need not be granted bail, released on probation or
paroled, but in practice they are being given these benefits.
The main difference between the provisions of the several states of
the United States and those of England and the other European countries lies in the ineligibility of the habitual offender to bail, probation
149
and parole.
English law provides that where an offender who was previously
convicted of an offense punishable with imprisonment for a term of
two years or more, is convicted of an offense punishable with imprisonment for a term of two years or more, committed before the expiration
146 E.g., MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 279, § 25 (1968).
147 E.g., TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. arts. 61, 62, 64 (1952).
148 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE ANN. § 644 (Deering 1971); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 (McKinney
1967); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. art. 63 (1952).
149 See Bail, Probation and Parole, supra.
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of three years from his release from prison, the court may impose a
term exceeding the maximum term authorized for the offense.' 5 0
French law directs the court to assess a term of imprisonment at the
maximum provided for by the penal code in case of a second offense,
and it gives the court authority to extend the term even further up to
double punishment.""' In Italian law, the term of imprisonment for a
second offense is increased by one-sixth. It is, however, increased up to
one-half if the offense is of the same type as the first offense, or if it is
committed within five years from the first conviction. 5 2 Upon a third
conviction, the offender may be declared to be a habitual criminal. 153
The effect of such a declaration is that the offender is, upon serving
his term, further detained in a labor institution for a minimum of two
to four years., 4 In Spanish law, conviction for a second offense is considered an aggravating circumstance and carries with it an increased
term of imprisonment. 155
In German law, a person who is convicted of a third offense and who
has on both previous occasions been assessed a term of imprisonment
of not less than six months, may be incarcerated for a term of up to
five years if the third offense is a misdemeanor, and up to fifteen years
if it is a felony. 156 In Austrian law, the fact of a second or further conviction amounts to an aggravating circumstance and exposes the offender
to an increased term of imprisonment. 157 In Swiss law, a habitual criminal may be imprisoned indefinitely but for not less than three years.
If the offense for which he is convicted carries a term longer than three
years, he may not be released before that term has run.15 8
DEVICES THAT SIMPLIFY AND SPEED UP CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS

A typical criminal proceeding in the countries of Continental Europe
in the case of more serious offenses is initiated by the office of the public
150 Criminal justice Act 1967, c. 80, § 37. Section 37 provides that where an offender
who was previously convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of
two years or more, is convicted of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term of
two years or more committed before the expiration of three years from his release from
prison, and if the court is satisfied that it is expedient to protect the public from him, the
court may impose a term exceeding the maximum term authorized for the offence if the
maximum so authorized is less than ten years, but shall not exceed ten years if the maximum so authorized is less than ten years, or exceed five years if the maximum so authorized is less than five years.
151 C. Pn. arts. 56-58.
152 C. Pen. art. 99.
153 C. Pen. arts. 104-105.
154 C. Pen. arts. 216-217.

155 C. Pen. arts. 19 (14), 61.
156 StGB § 20a.
157 StG §§ 44, 176.

158 StGB art. 42.

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

25

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 3 [2022], No. 2, Art. 1

ST..MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3"177

prosecutor which files a charge against the reputed Offender in the
proper criminal court. The charge is based on information supplied
by the victim, witnesses and the police. Acting on the charge, the court
appoints a judge, known as an investigating judge, to take care of the
matter and to carry out a thorough investigation. The judge hears
the victim, the witnesses, the police, the prosecutor, the person charged
and his attorney. He studies all possible leads, consults experts, makes
his findings, and does all that is necessary to enable the court to reach
a conclusion as to whether the person charged should stand trial or
whether the case against him should be dropped. Having made his
findings, the judge transmits the papers to the prosecutor for further
action. The prosecutor can either abandon the matter if on the findings
of the investigating judge the case appears not to be strong enough
for conviction. If he requests trial, the court will rule on the request
after having made a thorough study of the case. If it rules that the
person should stand trial, trial will take place promptly. The trial court
is composed either of a single judge or of three judges, in accordance
with the seriousness of the offense charged; or in felonies, of three
judges and usually of a jury of six, sitting together with the court as
one unit. At trial, proof is offered by the prosecution, witnesses for
prosecution and defense are examined, cross-examined and re-examined,
and the accused is heard through his attorney and by himself. The trial
court is required by law to study the case ex officio and not to rely only
on the facts and law submitted by the parties. If the court is composed
of three judges, or of three judges and a jury, a two-thirds majority of
its members is usually required for conviction and a simple majority
for the assessment of punishment. The final decision of the court is
appealable as well as its intermediate rulings, usually within one week
from the decision. If the appellate court disagrees with the trial court,
it must render a new decision. It may remand the matter back to the
trial court only when the judgment suffers from a defect (breach of the
law) for which it should be quashed. In addition to an appeal, a judgment of the trial court may be quashed for breach of law by a proper
cassation court. This remedy is, however, exceedingly rare.
It immediately appears that in the Continental proceeding there is
no grand jury. The question whether the person charged should stand
trial is answered by a court on the basis of a thorough, methodical
investigation conducted by an independent investigating judge appointed for life. The proceedings of the grand jury are not only cumbersome, but in their result stand no comparison with the reasoned
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finding of the investigating judge and the ruling of a court. No wonder
that grand juries were abolished even in England where they were
originally set up.159
On the strength of a proper finding by the investigating judge, the
public prosecutor is bound to prosecute the person charged with the
offense appearing in the finding. Any agreement between prosecution
and defense to drop a more serious charge in exchange for an undertaking to plead guilty to a lesser charge so familiar in some jurisdictions,
is unheard of in both Continental Europe and in England. It would not
only be unethical but in direct breach of the law and would expose
all parties to prosecution.. Since the circumstances of the case have been
scientifically examined by the investigating judge laying thus the
groundwork for trial, the trial can proceed smoothly and speedily.
Also, since the investigating judge has screened the evidence and separated the admissible evidence from the inadmissible, no problems of
admissibility of evidence are usually encountered at trial. Consequently,
no dilatory tactics are available to the defense.
In rendering judgment, both judges and jurors vote on the facts of
the case, there being no reason why the judges should not be allowed
so to do, as they admittedly can form an opinion on the facts just like
the jurors. And since the jury sits with the judges as one unit, no
special instructions to the jury are necessary. The function of the jurors
is thus of an increased importance as they are elevated to members of
the court and sit as lay judges.
If the decision of the trial court is guilty, the only way open to the
defense to contest it is an appeal. No motion of any kind (like a motion
for a new trial) is entertainable. The appeal is disposed of speedily by
the appellate court, and if the decision of the trial court is modified,
the appellate court renders a new final judgment. Further appeal to
the highest court in the country is available only in felonies and only
for breach of the law.
The entire proceeding is therefore quite speedy, consonant with the
well known principle of criminal law enforcement that speedy justice
provides a considerable deterrent to crime, making it clear to prospective offenders that crime does not pay. Conversely, it is evident that
159 Grand juries were abolished in England by the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1933, 251& 24 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 1, and they were finally eliminated
in the counties of London and Middlesex by the Criminal Justice Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo.
6, c. 58, § 31 (3). Commitment for trial is made in the magistrates' court after preliminary
examination by justices. Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1933, 23
& 24 Geo. 5, c. 36, § 2; Criminal Justice Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo. 5, c. 86, §§ 12, 13, 14.
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if a system allows the criminal to engage the courts in a seemingly
endless battle of motions, changes of site, new trials, etc., especially
while the criminal is free on bail, it cannot be expected to produce a
desirable deterrent to crime in the minds of likely offenders. In this
connection it may safely be said that mere technicalities should not be
allowed to fetter the system and give the criminal an undue advantage
in criminal proceedings. Such technicalities should be discarded just
as they were done away with in England and in the countries of Continental Europe. To discard these fetters on criminal procedure and
to achieve suitable improvements, it is imperative to work toward such
changes and modifications which would bring about a betterment of
the existing system without surrendering any of the well established
principles of liberty and personal freedom.
It should also be noted that any rights a person accused of having
committed a crime might have with respect to fair treatment and fair
trial, including the presumption of innocence until conviction, must be
viewed in conjunction with the right of every person to his physical
integrity and to that of his property. Also, the right of every person not
to be the victim of crime should not be lost from sight. A fair and just
criminal procedure must balance these interests and must pay due
respect to the interests of the accused as well as to those of the victim
and to those of society at large.
CONCLUSION

A comparison of some aspects of the American, English and Continental systems of criminal law and law enforcement reveals that the observations made by Roscoe Pound in his St. Paul address of 1906160 have
still not lost their persuasiveness. Granted that the judicial system and
criminal procedure of the United States are derived from those of
England, it may not be fruitless to have a look at the English and Continental systems as they stand today for possible suggestions. The English criminal law and procedure went through several periods of
successful reforms both in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
which made it a modern, workable system. There are no grand juries;
no excessive dilatory tactics are tolerated in the trial system; no repeated
motions for a new trial or against the sentence are allowed; bail, probation and parole are confined to narrow limits; meaningful sentences are
assessed; and habitual criminals are kept reasonably off the streets. A
160 Roscoe Pound's address at the twenty-ninth annual meeting of the American Bar
Association held in St. Paul, Minnesota, on August 29, 1906.
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glance at the Continental system reveals suggestions for further innovations, like a vigorous system of crime investigation conducted by independent investigating judges, a system of smooth, speedy proceedings
from arrest to conviction, juries only in felony cases of not more than
six to nine jurors sitting usually with the court as lay judges.
It is inescapable that an improved judicial system would require a
considerable increase in judicial personnel but it must be remembered
that practically any meaningful improvement would have to begin with
the appointment of additional judges to relieve the heavily overworked
conditions presently prevailing in the administration of criminal law
throughout the country. Although many aspects of the European
system are clearly not readily transplantable, it is evident that some
features of the English and Continental systems might be considered as
suggestions for possible improvements.
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